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to dismiss him. Perhaps the truest objection to Turner, and the one
most often spoken and unspoken, was best expressed in a study of the
Midwest where the authors wrote: "We need our own story.''38 As an
iconoclast, Turner would not find that idea objectionable. As he
wrote, and put in italics, in his essay on "The Significance of History": after all "Each age writes the historyof thepast anew with referenceto
the conditionsuppermostin its own time."

Frontier Democracy: The Turner Thesis Revisited
Lacy K. Ford, Jr.
The one-hundredth anniversary of Frederick Jackson Turner's presentation of his pathbreaking essay, "The Significance of the Frontier
in American History," to the American Historical Association meeting in Chicago provides a propitious occasion for a brief reassessment
of the "frontier thesis" and its lingering influence on the historiography of antebellum America. Turner's frontier thesis, with its emphasis on cheap western land and abundant economic opportunity,
captured the popular imagination more than any other sweeping explanation of how the American national character was formed.' The
two chief rivals of Turner's frontier thesis-Charles Beard's theme of
recurring economic conflict between agrarian interests and commercial capitalism and Louis Hartz's contention that the principal formative influence on American character was a longstanding "liberal"
consensus on the efficacy of political democracy and free-market capiboth earned as much attention from scholars as has
talism-have

38

Ibid., 126.

Lacy K. Ford, Jr., is Associate Professor of History at the University of
South Carolina. His book, Origins of SouthernRadicalism. The South Carolina Upcountry,
1800-1860 (1988) won the Francis Butler Simkins Prize of the Southern Historical
Association.
Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in American
History," in Annual Report of the AmericanHistorical Associationfor the Year1893 (Washington, D.C. 1894), 197-228. For a recent reevaluation of Turner, see William
Cronon, "Revisiting the Vanishing Frontier: The Legacy of Frederick Jackson
Turner," WesternHistorical Quarterly,18 (Apr. 1987), 157-176.
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Turner's interpretation; but neither challenger has so captured the
public mind.2 Hartz's argument for pervasive liberalism proved to be
a period piece heavily influenced by the solid anti-communist front of
the 1950s as well as that era's vanilla image of Americans as "Ike"voting, "Lucy"-watching, middle-class conformists. Hartz's liberal
consensus position, which had always strained to explain away the
Civil War, easily was shattered by the contentious decade of the
1960s, with its raucous challenge to established mores.3 Beard's economic-conflict thesis, fully articulated by 1930, has demonstrated considerably more staying power among historians. Many active
scholars, led by those on the political left, still emphasize economic
struggle and class conflict as the chief sources of creative tension in
American history.4 But if modified Beardian interpretations remain
visible in American historiography after more than half a century, his
influence has always been felt primarily within the academy. The
larger reading public remains almost instinctively resistant to any
suggestion that their history has been riddled with class conflict.
Firmly attached to the idea of American exceptionalism, Americans
have searched their history (however superficially) for the source of
their nation's singular character, and they have found in Turner's
frontier thesis a plausible, and perhaps even compelling, explanation.5 Very recently, in his inaugural call for American renewal, new
President Bill Clinton articulated a thoroughly Turnerian view of
Americans as "a restless, questing, hopeful people."6
2 For Beard's
overview, see Charles Beard and Mary Beard, The Rise of American Civilization (New York 1927); Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America. An
Interpretationof American Political Thought Since the Revolution (New York 1955); and John
Patrick Diggins, The Lost Soul of AmericanPolitics: Virtue, Self-Interest,and the Foundations
of Liberalism(New York 1984), 122.
3 Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The
"Objectivity Question" and the American
Historical Profession(Cambridge, Mass. 1988), 320-468.
4 Richard
Hofstadter, The ProgressiveHistorians. Turner, Beard, Parrington (New
York 1968), 167-346; Lee Benson, Turnerand Beard. American Historical Writing Reconsidered (New York 1960), 95-213; John Patrick Diggins, "Power and Authority in
American History: The Case of Charles A. Beard and His Critics," AmericanHistorical Review, 86 (Oct. 1981), 701-730.
5 David W.
Noble, Historians Against History. The Frontier Thesis and the National
Covenantin AmericanHistorical Writing Since 1830 (Minneapolis 1965), esp. 37-55; Jackson K. Putnam, "The Turner Thesis and the Westward Movement: A ReapWestern Historical Quarterly, 7 (Oct. 1976), 377-404; Martin Ridge,
praisal,"
"Frederick Jackson Turner and His Ghost: The Writing of Western History," Proceedingsof theAmericanAntiquarian Society, 101 (Apr. 1991), 65-76.
6
New York (N.Y.) Times, Jan. 21, 1993.
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It is hardly surprising that when Americans seek inspiration from
their past that they would turn to the cautious progressive, Turner,
rather than to the radical Beard.7 After all, if Walt Whitman was the
poet laureate of American democracy, Frederick Jackson Turner was
its first professional court historian. But perhaps more importantly,
there is arguably something about Turner and his frontier thesis, inspired as it was by the twilight years of the nineteenth century, that
speaks directly to our condition in the waning years of the twentieth.
The normally optimistic Turner wrote his celebrated frontier essay in an odd moment of anxiety, as he fretted over a casual observation by a census bureau official that the 1890 enumeration revealed
no discernible outer boundary of settlement, no legitimate "frontier."8 Turner worried that the passing of the frontier marked a point
of no return in the steady purchase of urbanization and industrialization on the essentially agrarian republic of the nineteenth century. He
feared that the Jeffersonian ideals of the family-farm yeomanry were
being sacrificed on the altar of industrial capitalism by Wall Street's
high priests of finance. Moreover, even though the nation's population was overwhelmingly rural when Turner was born in 1861, it had
become nearly half urban by the time he wrote his frontier essay, and
by 1920, when Turner published a book of essays reprinting his much
acclaimed frontier piece, a majority of the American people lived in
urban areas. As small-farm America disappeared, Turner, an affectionate son of the middle border, saw his worst nightmare realized: a
cramped, crowded, "Europeanized" America that was losing its distinctiveness. With the budding Populist revolt of the 1890s providing
unmistakable background noise, the provincial Turner wrote his frontier essay to warn of impending decline.9
Late twentieth-century Americans labor under a surprisingly similar anxiety. The United States' modern self-image as a powerful industrial behemoth, a nation with "big shoulders," is being tried
sorely by the enervating competition of a new global economy. The
apparent decline of heavy industry, the flow of jobs overseas, and a
per capita income that has fallen out of the world's top dozen have
7
Novick, That Noble Dream, 87-108.
8 Hofstadter, The
ProgressiveHistorians, 47-83; Benson, Turnerand Beard, 41-91.
9 Martin
Ridge, "Frederick Jackson Turner, Ray Allen Billington, and American Frontier History," WesternHistorical Quarterly, 19 (Jan. 1988), 4-20. Turner explained why he feared that the closing of the frontier portended decline again in his
"The Significance of the Sections in American History," Wisconsin Magazine of History, 8 (Mar. 1925), 255-280.

A SYMPOSIUM

ON FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER

147

sparked fears about the coming post-industrial order that closely parallel the fears Americans of the 1890s felt about the emerging industrial order. Moreover, the winding down of America's industrial
century has been marked by a demographic shift that parallels the
rapid urbanization of the late nineteenth century. In the 1990s, for
the first time, the majority of Americans are neither rural nor urban
but suburban. Just as the alleged closing of the western frontier signaled Turner that the agrarian republic was losing out to urban, industrial society, deindustrialization and the movement of people to
the crabgrass frontier suggest to many late twentieth-century Americans the disconcerting arrival of new, post-industrial, suburban society.10
This angst of the post-modern era informs our moment for reviewing Turner's old arguments on behalf of American exceptionalism,
and particularly his contention that the frontier served as the "sociocultural furnace" in which American democracy was forged." In recent decades, two identifiable trends in American historiography have
borne more or less directly on Turner's "frontier democracy" hypothesis. One of these trends involves the rapidly proliferating body
of literature labeled as the "new social history" and the "new economic history." These studies employ an array of analytical tech10For a brief introduction to these themes, see Lester C. Thurow, TheZero-Sum

Distribution
andthePossibilitiesfor
Economic
Society:
Change
(New York1980);RobertB.
Ourselvesfor
Twenty-First
Reich, TheWorkof Nations.Preparing
Century
Capitalism
(New
York 1991);RobertKuttner, TheEndof Laissez-Faire:
NationalPurpose
andTheGlobal

EconomyAfterthe Cold War(New York 1991); Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of
the GreatPowers(New York 1988); William Schneider, "The Suburban Century Begins," The Atlantic,270 (July 1992), 33-44; and Kenneth T. Jackson, The Crabgrass

Frontier.
TheSuburbanization
oftheUnitedStates(New York1985), 231-305.

" Michael P. Malone,
"Beyond the Last Frontier: Toward a New Approach to
Western American History," WesternHistoricalQuarterly,20 (Nov. 1989), 409-427
(quotation at 410). Turner, a product of his era as well as his region, defined "democracy" in such a way that it applied essentially to males, and usually to white
males. Thus he found "democratic" leanings among people who advocated extremely anti-democratic measures regarding women, African-Americans (slave and
free), and Native Americans. In addition to the first article cited in this note, these
severe problems with Turner's understanding of democracy have been vividly enumerated in Patricia Nelson Limerick, TheLegacyof Conquest.The Unbroken
Past of the
AmericanWest(New York 1987); Joan M. Jensen and Darlis A. Miller, "The Gentle
Tamers Revisited: New Approaches to the History of Women in the American
West," PacificHistoricalReview,49 (May 1980), 173-213; and Cronon, "The Vanishing Frontier," 173-176. For this essay, I have attempted to examine the effect of the
frontier on American "democracy" using Turner's own understanding of democracy
as the standard, so that his work might be judged on its own terms.
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niques and computerized data bases, borrowed from the social
sciences, to study migration patterns, social mobility, wealth distribution, and class structure. These methodologically sophisticated approaches have produced a number of detailed studies of nineteenthcentury communities, regions, and social groups and facilitated the
first rigorous empirical testing of Turner's safety-valve argument.12
The other historiographical trend that is especially relevant to any
reassessment of Turner's thesis is the recent flurry of state, local, and
regional studies of political culture during the American middle period. These studies, heavily influenced by the "republican synthesis"
that reshaped our understanding of revolutionary era politics during
the 1970s, pay special attention to issues such as suffrage and representation, and hence shed important new light on the social forces
driving political democratization in antebellum America.13
The recent wealth of scholarship using the methods of the "new
social" or "new economic" history still begs for coherent synthesis,
but on balance this literature suggests that if "frontier democracy"
meant anything like social or economic equality, or even rough equality of opportunity, then western reality fell far short of the Turnerian
ideal. As a rule on the American frontier, from Ohio and Tennessee
westward to California, settlement was followed quickly by the emer-

12 For an introduction
to this vast literature, see Howard P. Chudacoff, "Success and Security: The Meaning of Social Mobility in America," Reviews in American
History, 10 (Dec. 1982), 101-112; Theodore K. Rabb, "The Development of Quantification in Historical Research," Journal of InterdisciplinaryHistory, 13 (Spring 1983),
591-602; J. Morgan Kousser, "The State of Social Science History in the Late
1980s," Historical Methods, 22 (Winter 1989), 13-20; Hugh Rockoff, "History and
Economics," Social ScienceHistory, 15 (Summer 1991), 239-264; and Lance E. Davis
and Stanley Engerman, "Cliometrics: The State of the Science (or Is It Art or, perhaps, Witchcraft?)," Historical Methods, 20 (Summer 1987), 97-106. Bernard Bailyn,
"The Challenge of Modern Historiography," American Historical Review, 87 (Feb.
1982), 1-24, is perhaps the most prominent of many works that express skepticism
about the recent trend toward treating history as a social science. Richard Jensen,
"On Modernizing Frederick Jackson Turner: The Historiography of Regionalism,"
WesternHistorical Quarterly,11 (July 1980), 307-322, briefly examines how the community and regional focus of the "new" social science-oriented history has revived interest in Turner's arguments.
13 For
analysis of this trend, see Daniel T. Rodgers, "Republicanism: The Career of a Concept," Journal of American History, 79 (June 1992), 11-38; Joyce Appleby,
"Republicanism and Ideology," American Quarterly, 37 (Fall 1985), 461-473; Sean
Wilentz, "On Class and Politics in Jacksonian America," Reviews in AmericanHistory,
10 (Dec. 1982), 45-63; and Robert E. Shalhope, "Republicanism and Early American Historiography," William and Mary Quarterly,39 (Apr. 1982), 334-356.
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gence of powerful local elites, often composed of successful land speculators who quickly stamped their influence on their locale. Some
members of these elites were self-made men, but most drew heavily
on family wealth and connections back in the East.14 Upward mobility
rates in frontier areas as different as Chillicothe, Ohio, in the early
1800s and San Francisco in the 1850s suggest a degree of opportunity
only slightly greater than that available in long-established eastern cities, and if opportunity to move up was slightly greater in frontier
towns than eastern cities, so too was the possibility of going broke.15
The boom or bust economies of frontier towns so frightened
newly formed elites that fierce competition among aspiring banking
and mercantile leaders often grudgingly gave way to a spirit of voluntary cooperation. Frontier entrepreneurs quickly realized that their
individual fortunes depended heavily on the larger economic fate of
their towns, and that the towns themselves competed with nearby rivals for population, trade, and government favor. Thus the relentless
quest for economic growth, some authors suggest, turned frontier
towns into centers of bourgeois cooperation and boosterism rather
than the testing ground of rugged individualism suggested by Turnerian lore.16 Of course, as Don H. Doyle has rightly reminded us, any
model of frontier towns that emphasizes only entrepreneurial collaboration is as unbalanced as Turner's emphasis on unfettered individualism. Despite the harmonious images projected by boosters, frontier
towns witnessed violence and conflict with "southerners caning Yankees, vigilante mobs chasing abolitionists, Christians squabbling over
the doctrine of infant baptism, police raids on Irish grog shops," and
other types of internecine quarrels.17 Frontier elites reluctantly

14 For an
historiographical overview, see Ralph Mann, "Frontier Opportunity
and the New Social History," Pacific Historical Review, 53 (Nov. 1984), 463-491.
15 Peter Decker, Fortunes and Failures. White Collar Mobility in Nineteenth
Century
San Francisco (Cambridge, Mass. 1978); Jeffrey P. Brown, "Chillicothe's Elite: Leadership in a Frontier Community," Ohio History, 96 (Summer/Autumn 1987), 140156; Stephan Thernstrom, The OtherBostonians. Povertyand Progress in the AmericanMetropolis, 1880-1970 (Cambridge, Mass. 1973); Clyde and Sally Griffen, Natives and
Newcomers: The Ordering of Opportunity in Mid-Nineteenth Century Poughkeepsie (Cambridge, Mass. 1978).
16 This
frontier-as-incubator-of-cooperation
argument was pioneered by Stanley
Elkins and Eric McKitrick, "A Meaning For Turner's Frontier, Part I: Democracy
in the Old Northwest," Political Science Quarterly,69 (Sept. 1954), 321-353; and Daniel
Boorstin, The Americans. The National Experience(New York 1965), esp. 113-168.
17 Don Harrison
Doyle, "Social Theory and New Communities in NineteenthCentury America," WesternHistorical Quarterly, 8 (Apr. 1977), 151-165 (quotation at
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acknowledged the futility of eliminating such conflict, but they embraced the idea of containing these conflicts within acceptable boundaries as the key to social stability and economic growth.
The instruments for controlling inevitable conflict, according to
Doyle, were the civic, religious, and political institutions that eventually came to dominate frontier towns. These churches, political parties, and business clubs served to institutionalize conflict, thereby
diverting sectarian disputes, political grudges, and business rivalries
into channels where rational, if heated, debate displaced violent physical assault. These voluntary institutions, Doyle emphasizes, did not
eliminate conflict so much as routinize it, but in so doing they provided venues and organizations through which like-minded members
of frontier communities pursued common goals. Thus frontier towns
were sustained not by the individual self-assertion celebrated by
Turner nor by the neighborly cooperation touted by his early critics,
but by the rapid evolution of the unglamorous social bureaucracies of
churches, schools, civic clubs, and political parties. If frontier towns
defined American democracy, then the latter is better understood as
the product of pious "joiners," sociable women, and "clubable"
middle-class men than the heroic egalitarians of Turner's imagined
West.18

Recent studies of the rural frontier, in both North and South, also
present an ambiguous picture of opportunity and social mobility. The
rural North, where commercial agriculture predominated but the scarcity of labor limited farm size, boasted a more even distribution of
wealth than either the rural South, where slaves provided the plantation labor force, or the urban North, where propertyless free laborers
constituted a significant portion of the population. But even in the rural North, as Jeremy Atack and Fred Bateman have pointed out, the
distribution of wealth hardly fit the "classic egalitarian" model. By
1860, the richest 20 percent of all households in the rural North controlled over 60 percent of the wealth.19 This distribution was markedly
more even than that of the cotton South, where the wealthiest

157). Earlier works that emphasize conflict on the frontier include Allen G. Bogue,
"Social Theory and the Pioneer," Agricultural History, 34 (Jan. 1960), 21-34; and
Robert R. Dykstra, The Cattle Towns (New York 1968).
18 Don Harrison
Doyle, The Social Orderof a Frontier Community:Jacksonville, Illinois, 1825-1870 (Urbana 1978), 62-91, 156-193.
'9 Jeremy Atack and Fred Bateman, "The 'Egalitarian Ideal' and the Distribution of Wealth in the Northern Agricultural Community: A Backward Look," Review
of Economicsand Statistics, 63 (Feb. 1981), 124-129.
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Figure 2. Professor Turner, University of Wisconsin, 1881
Source: State Historical Society of Wisconsin.

10 percent of households owned over 60 percent of the wealth, or that
of northern cities such as Boston or New York, where the richest 5
percent of the population controlled nearly two thirds of the wealth.20
But within the rural North, once adjustments are made for the differing age structure of the populations, wealth was only marginally more
evenly distributed on the "frontier" (one fifth owning 64 percent)
than it was in the older Northeast (one fifth owning 67 percent).21

Gavin Wright, The Political Economyof the Cotton South: Households, Markets, and
Wealth in the Nineteenth Century(New York 1978), 24-37; Edward Pessen, "The Egalitarian Myth and the American Social Reality: Wealth, Mobility, and Equality in the
'Era of the Common Man'," AmericanHistorical Review, 76 (Oct. 1971), 989-1031.
21
Atack and Bateman, "The 'Egalitarian Ideal,"' 125-126.
20
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Even if the frontier did not produce an egalitarian distribution of
wealth, recent scholarship suggests that prospects for upward mobility
were reasonably good in antebellum America, and especially good on
the frontier. Life-cycle models of wealth accumulation presume that
households grow wealthier as their heads grow older, with accumulation levelling off as the head approaches "retirement" age. Such
models neatly explain the economic career of the typical antebellum
rural white American.22 Roughly two thirds of rural antebellum
householders owned land (though the percentage varied widely from
locale to locale and may have been slightly lower in the plantation
South than elsewhere), and the majority of landless householders were
young tenants whose chances were reasonably good for acquiring
land as they grew older.23
Throughout the antebellum era, this "agricultural ladder" remained a viable instrument for upward social mobility in both the
North and South. Young tenants, lacking capital and perhaps expertise, worked as renters for several years until profit, inheritance, or
propitious marriage allowed them to purchase land. In the rural
North, for instance, over 60 percent of all tenant farmers were under
age forty. While over 23 percent of young farm operators (under the
age of twenty-five) were tenants, fewer than 7 percent of those over
age 50 still worked on rented farms.24 A similar pattern held in the
rural South, where over 60 percent of all tenants had yet to reach age

22
Jeremy Atack and Fred Bateman, "Egalitarianism, Inequality, and Age:
The Rural North in 1860," Journal of EconomicHistory, 41 (Mar. 1981), 85-93.
23
The list of local studies documenting this point is far too long to be cited
here, but for a sampling, see Donald L. Winters, "'Plain Folk' of the Old South
Reexamined: Economic Democracy in Tennessee," Journal of Southern History, 53
(Nov. 1987), 565-586; Randolph B. Campbell, "Planters and Plain Folk: Harrison
County, Texas, as a Test Case, 1850-1860," ibid., 40 (Aug. 1974), 369-398; Donald
Schaefer, "Yeoman Farmers and Economic Democracy: A Study of Wealth and Economic Mobility in the Western Tobacco Region, 1850-1860," Explorations in Economic History, 15 (Oct. 1978), 421-437; Jeremy Atack and Fred Bateman, To Their
Own Soil: Agriculturein the AntebellumNorth (Ames, Iowa 1987); Hal S. Barron, Those
Who Stayed Behind: Rural Society in Nineteenth CenturyNew England (Cambridge, Mass.
1984); Robert P. Swierenga, "Quantitative Methods in Rural Landholding," Journal
of InterdisciplinaryHistory, 13 (Spring 1983), 787-808; and Jeremy Atack, "Tenants
and Yeoman in the Nineteenth Century," AgriculturalHistory, 62 (Summer 1988), 6-

32.
Jeremy Atack, "The Agricultural Ladder Revisited: A New Look at an Old
Question with Some Data for 1860," Agricultural History, 63 (Winter 1989), 1-25;
Donald L. Winters, "Agricultural Tenancy in the Nineteenth Century Middle West:
The Historiographical Debate," Indiana Magazine of History, 78 (June 1982), 128-153.
24
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forty, and where roughly 30 percent of all farm operators under age
thirty were tenants while all but 12 percent of those over age forty
owned their own land. Moreover, preliminary study reveals that
nearly three fourths of all southern tenants in 1850 who remained in
the same county until 1860 were successful in acquiring land.25 Thus,
in both the slaveholding and non-slaveholding sections of the preCivil War United States, prospects for both realizing the Jeffersonian
dream of land ownership and of steadily increasing one's family
wealth over a lifetime were quite good even though the overall distribution of wealth remained highly uneven in all parts of the country.
Modern scholarship appears to confirm the popular Turnerian
perception that from the microeconomic vantage point of individual
households, whether North or South, a decision to move to the frontier in search of a better life stood a good chance of proving correct.
Nevertheless, as Harold Woodman has suggested, the aggregate or
macroeconomic impact of the frontier on the antebellum economy
and living standards was characterized by ambiguity and important
regional variations. Between 1840 and 1860, a period of heavy westward migration, the national economy grew at an impressive rate.
Due largely to the cotton boom of the 1850s, per capita income in the
South grew even more rapidly than it did in the North, where personal incomes grew by a robust 30 percent during the twenty year
period. Most of the apparent increase in per capita income in the
staple-dominated South, however, owed to the movement of people
out of older cotton and tobacco regions and into the virgin lands of
the southwestern frontier. Without this movement out of the comparatively low income South Atlantic region and into the flush environment of the cotton frontier, personal income in the South would have
grown more slowly than that of the North, notwithstanding the high
cotton profits of the 1850s.
In the cotton South, the availability of agricultural land on the
frontier may have enhanced inequalities of wealth among whites in
the region, but it contributed mightily to overall economic growth. In
the antebellum North, however, the Northeast had both a substan-

25
Donald L. Winters, "The Agricultural Ladder in Southern Agriculture:
Tennessee, 1850-1870," Agricultural History, 61 (Summer 1987), 36-52. For a comprehensive discussion of the methodological problems involved in studying tenancy in
the Old South, see Frederick A. Bode and Donald E. Ginter, Farm Tenancy and the
Census in Antebellum Georgia (Athens 1986); and John T. Houdek and Charles F.
Farm Tenants: An Evaluation of
Heller, Jr., "Searching for Nineteenth-Century
Methods," Historical Methods, 19 (Spring 1986), 55-61.
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tially higher per capita income and a slightly faster rate of growth
between 1840 and 1860 than did the region closer to the frontier,
which experienced a 250 percent increase in population during the
era. In fact, per capita incomes in the industrializing Northeast were
nearly twice as high as those of the agricultural Northwest in both
1840 and 1860. In macroeconomic terms at least, northerners who
left the industrial Northeast for the frontier moved from an area of
high but very unevenly distributed incomes to an area of significantly
lower but somewhat more evenly distributed earnings. In the face of
this evidence, the massive relocation of northerners to the free-state
frontier appears, on the surface, to represent a curious shift from a
high-income area to a lower-income area. But a balanced assessment
of the impact of the free-soil frontier on the antebellum northern
economy requires an exercise in counterfactual history. Without the
frontier as an economic "safety-valve," it is doubtful that the Northeast could have absorbed the large numbers of foreign immigrants it
received during the 1840s and 1850s and still maintained its high level
of personal income. Thus the frontier probably helped sustain antebellum northern prosperity even if it was not that region's engine of
economic growth. Of course, if frontier land had not been available,
it is possible that the antebellum North, like the antebellum South,
would have attracted relatively few immigrants. In that case, income
growth for native-born northerners might have been impressive despite the lack of cheap land, but the character of the nation as a
whole, without the immigration, would have been altered dramatically.26
Taken together, these studies of individual social mobility and aggregate economic development reveal that antebellum America was a
land of remarkable economic opportunity, and that, as Turner hypothesized, the frontier did much to enhance that opportunity.27 In

26
This discussion draws heavily on Harold D. Woodman, "Economic History
and Economic Theory: The New Economic History in America," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 3 (Autumn 1972), 323-350; but see also Robert E. Gallman, "Slavery
and Southern Economic Growth," SouthernEconomicJournal, 45 (Apr. 1979), 10071022; Donald F. Schaefer, "A Model of Migration and Wealth Accumulation:
Farmers at the Antebellum Southern Frontier," Explorations in Economic History, 24
East(Apr. 1987), 130-157; and Richard H. Steckel, "The Economic Foundations of
West Migration During the 19th Century," Explorations in Economic History, 20 (Jan.
1983), 14-36.
"The Study of Social Mobility: Ideological Assumptions
27 James A. Henretta,
and Conceptual Bias," Labor History, 18 (Spring 1977), 165-178, and other studies
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the South, the continued presence of a cotton frontier drove the region's impressive growth. In the North, the dynamics of growth owed
more to the bustling commerce and budding manufacturing system of
the Northeast than the frontier bread-basket, but the presence of the
frontier facilitated northern growth even if it was not its primary
cause. Yet for many antebellum Americans, economic well-being
probably was not measured in terms of income levels (which were
generally improving) or wealth distribution (which was generally
worsening), but of personal or household independence. The foundation of independence was ownership and control of productive property, and thus land ownership was often considered a better measure
of economic status than income. An impressive outpouring of literature that often disagrees on other matters supports that the notion
that, above all else, antebellum Americans loathed the dependence of
propertyless wage laborers.28 And they were generally successful, in
the short run, in avoiding what modern scholars, following Marx, call
"proletarianization," because the frontier eased the way to property
ownership with its abundant and relatively cheap land.29 In doing so,
the frontier "safety-valve" undoubtedly helped sustain the Jeffersonian ideal of independence, much as Turner maintained a century
ago.
In recent decades, a number of scholars have argued that politics,
not the frontier, served as the true "safety-valve" in American life.
The United States, the argument goes, was the only modern indus-

point out that cliometric work probably overstates the case for upward mobility since
it tends to focus on those who "persist" over time in the same locale. These "persisters," it is argued, likely fared better on the average that their more mobile one-time
neighbors, who moved often because of their lack of economic success. But even if
recent works overstate the case for general upward mobility in antebellum America,
the data provides almost incontrovertible proof that there was enough genuine upward mobility to sustain the popular perception of America, and its frontier, as a
land of unique opportunity.
28 For a
sample, see Steven Hahn, The Roots of SouthernPopulism. YeomanFarmers
and the Transformationof the Georgia Upcountry, 1850-1890 (New York 1983), esp. 15-85;
J. Mills Thornton III, Politics and Power in a Slave Society. Alabama, 1800-1860 (Baton
Rouge 1978), 54-58; Lacy K. Ford, Jr., Origins of SouthernRadicalism. The South Carolina Upcountry, 1800-1860 (New York 1988), 44-95; Harry L. Watson, Liberty and
Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America (New York 1990), 42-72; Bruce Laurie, Working People of Philadelphia, 1800-1850 (Philadelphia 1980); and Sean Wilentz, Chants
Democratic: New York City and the Rise of the American Working Class, 1788-1850 (New
York 1984), 61-142.
29 Gavin
Wright, "American Agriculture and the Labor Market: What Happened to Proletarianization?" AgriculturalHistory, 62 (Summer 1988), 182-209.
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trial nation to experience its democratic revolution before its industrial revolution. As a result, its comparatively inclusive politics muted
social antagonism by directing them into legitimate political channels.30 While Turner never offered such an argument, he asserted vehemently that political democracy was central to American
distinctiveness, and that the frontier, more than anything else, fostered democracy. Turner's insistence on this point has been one of
the most vigorously disputed aspects of his thesis.31 Three generations
of historians of the Jacksonian working class, from Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., through Edward Pessen, to Sean Wilentz, have argued persuasively that artisans, mechanics, and urban laborers pushed as hard
for democracy as did sturdy frontier yeomen.32 Comprehensive studies of suffrage by Chilton Williamson and of representation by J.R.
Pole also challenged Turner's frontier democracy thesis.33 In general,
liberalized suffrage requirements and more equitable schemes of legislative apportionment were realized more easily in the frontier states,
North and South, because democratic forces there had neither entrenched propertied elites nor difficult-to-amend eighteenth-century
constitutions to contend with. Moreover, recent scholarship suggests
that pressure for more legislative reapportionment came from areas
with underrepresented populations, regardless of their proximity to
the frontier. On this issue, the source of the egalitarian impulse was
demographic, not geographic.34 And, in at least one regard, states on
30 For a brief introduction to this
argument, see Eric Foner, "Why Is There No
Socialism in the United States," History WorkshopJournal, 17 (Spring 1984), 57-80.
31 Early criticisms of Turner on this point are well summarized in two articles by
Benjamin F. Wright, Jr.; see his "American Democracy and The Frontier," Yale
Review, 20 (Dec. 1930), 349-365, and "Political Institutions and the Frontier," in
Dixon R. Fox, ed., Sourcesof Culturein the Middle West. BackgroundsversusFrontier(New
York 1934), 15-38.
32 Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr., The Age ofJackson (New York 1945); Edward Pessen, Most UncommonJacksonians: Radical Leadersof the Early Labor Movement (New York
1967); Wilentz, Chants Democratic, 172-296.
33 Chilton Williamson, American Suffrage. From Property to Democracy, 1760-1860
(Princeton 1960); J. R. Pole, Political Representationin England and the Origins of the
AmericanRepublic (London 1966).
34 Pole, Political Representation,esp. 281-353. For a sample of more recent investigations, see Watson, Libertyand Power, 49-52; Ford, Origins of SouthernRadicalism, 106113; Marc W. Kruman, Parties and Politics in North Carolina, 1836-1865 (Baton Rouge
1983), 11-14, 86-103; Merrill D. Peterson, Democracy, Liberty, and Property. The State
ConstitutionalConventionsof the 1820s (Indianapolis 1966); and Dickson D. Bruce, Jr.,
The Rhetoricof Conservatism.The Virginia Conventionof 1829-30 and the ConservativeTradition in the South (San Marino 1982). An older but still very useful account is Fletcher
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the northern frontier lagged behind the free states on the seaboard:
five northeastern states permitted free blacks to vote under some circumstances, but all of the states of the Old Northwest, the so-called
"valley of democracy," limited suffrage to whites only.35
Yet recent historiography has fundamentally restructured our understanding of the meaning of "democracy" in its early national and
Jacksonian contexts. Political "democracy," as it was understood
through much of the antebellum era, was not a full-blown political
creed but rather a crucial component in the larger ideology of republicanism. Republican ideology was part of nineteenth-century America's political and intellectual inheritance from the revolutionary era,
and arguably the greatest achievement of the republican founders was
their embrace of popular sovereignty, the idea that the ultimate political authority lay with the "people," rather than with a king, an aristocracy, or a supreme Parliament. At the same time, many early
Americans feared majoritarian tyranny and democratic excess. The
nation envisioned by the founders was not a democracy where simple
majorities ruled but a republic whose structure incorporated elaborate
checks and balances that could stymie renegade majorities as well as
other threats to individual liberty. Moreover, the founders insisted
that the success of their republican experiment hinged on the maintenance of a social order where the widespread ownership of productive
property sustained an independent citizenry.36
In theory, at least, the popular political ideologies of the Jacksonian era continued to cherish independence and fear concentrated
power, even that of majorities. But, in practice, within the larger lan-

M. Green, ConstitutionalDevelopmentin the SouthAtlantic States, 1776-1860. A Study in the
Evolution of Democracy (Chapel Hill 1930). Green presents his interpretation as evidence supporting Turner's thesis, but while Green's work supports the case for vigorous democracy in the Old South, his specific findings do not suggest that the
frontier was democracy's primary agent.
35
Williamson, American Suffrage, 208-222; Leon F. Litwack, North of Slavery. The
Negro in the Free States, 1790-1860 (Chicago 1961), 64-112.
36
Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing The People. The Rise of Popular Sovereigntyin England and America (New York 1988), 207-306; Robert H. Wiebe, The Opening of American Society. From the Adoption of the Constitutionto the Eve of Disunion (New York 1984),
esp. 22-34; Jack N. Rakove, "The Madisonian Moment," University of Chicago Law
Review, 55 (Spring 1988), 473-505; James T. Kloppenberg, "The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism,
and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse," Journal of American History, 74 (June 1987), 9-33; Robert E. Shalhope,
"Thomas Jefferson's Republicanism and Antebellum Southern Thought," Journal of
SouthernHistory, 42 (Nov. 1976), 529-557.
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guage and existing governmental structure of republicanism, popular
political culture in virtually all parts of the United States grew steadily more egalitarian even before Andrew Jackson's first presidential
bid in 1824. Informal stump meetings, door-to-door canvassing, barbecues, and the politicization of militia musters, all brought de facto
democracy to the politics of the early republic well before suffrage
liberalization and other reforms formally opened the political process
to virtually all white men. Within this democratizing political culture,
Jacksonian political parties transformed the republican idea of popular sovereignty into an avowed democratic faith in the wisdom of popular majorities. Majority rule subtly replaced republican equipoise as
the political creed of the expanding nation.37 As William Freehling
has aptly noted, this gradual transformation dichotomized republicans into two camps, "elitist republicans" who wanted to retain as
much as possible the eighteenth-century traditions of gentry influence, the political prerogatives of property, and minority protection,
and "egalitarian republicans" interested in expanding participation,
majority rule, and the defense of the "people" against oligarchic
power.38 It is true that frontier states certainly favored the democratic
side of this struggle within an evolving republicanism, but the true
egalitarian impulse evolved more from the revolutionary heritage of
popular sovereignty than from frontier circumstances.
One result of the gradual triumph of egalitarian republicanism
over its more elitist rival involved the subtle broadening of the popular definition of "independence." In some areas "householders,"
heads of households who controlled their own affairs but owned no
property, were perceived as "independent." In urban areas, artisans,
craftsmen, and even skilled workers defined their work tools and spe-

37 For an introduction to these themes, see Steven J. Ross, "The Transformation of Republican Ideology," Journal of the Early Republic, 10 (Fall 1990), 323-330;
Thornton, Politics and Power, 117-162; Ford, Origins of Southern Radicalism, 99-182;
Rowland Berthoff, "Independence and Attachment, Virtue and Interest: From Republican Citizen to Free Enterpriser, 1787-1837," in Richard L. Bushman et al, eds.,
S.
UprootedAmericans: Essays to Honor Oscar Handlin (Boston 1979), 97-124; Gordon
Wood, The Radicalism of theAmericanRevolution(New York 1992), 229-369; and Daniel
Feller, "Politics and Society: Toward a Jacksonian Synthesis," Journal of the Early
Republic, 10 (Summer 1990), 135-162.
38 William
W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion: Secessionists At Bay, 1776-1854
York
1990), esp. 39-58. Freehling applies this dichotomy only to the antebel(New
lum South. I believe that, with appropriate adjustments for regional diversity, it is a
distinction that works reasonably well for the republic as whole during the early national and Jacksonian years.
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cific trade skills as their "property," their source of independence,
and in much of the South and Old Northwest, mere whiteness of skin
seemed to qualify men as independent. These more generous, more
inclusive definitions of independence tacitly permitted a fairly thorough democratization of antebellum political culture while leaving the
most cherished of republican ideals theoretically intact. Americans
continued to embrace "independence" as the essence of republican
citizenship even as the prerequisites for independence were significantly redefined.39
If the frontier was only one of many factors which played a role in
democratizing the political culture of American republicanism, it was
clearly a crucial factor in sustaining a republican social order in the
face of the "Market Revolution" that followed the War of 1812.40 As
Drew McCoy has emphasized, the availability of abundant western
land allowed the young republic to grow economically by expanding
through space, producing an ever larger agricultural surplus for market, rather than by developing over time, seeking profit through the
intensification of commerce and industrialization. Because of the
frontier, the republic sustained a huge and growing population of
yeoman freeholders, while others (tenants and farm laborers) held a
reasonable expectation of becoming yeoman freeholders, and still others (artisans and mechanics) identified themselves as the "yeomanry
of the city." By slowing the process of proletarianization in pre-Civil
War America, the frontier permitted egalitarian republicanism, with
its insistence on independence as the basis for citizenship, to postpone
for a generation its direct confrontation with the market revolution,
industrialization, and a large, dependent working class.41
The role of the frontier as a "safety-valve" that allowed the republic to postpone crises by diffusing them across space has become a
recurrent a theme in recent historical writing. Perhaps the most pro39 Pole, Political
332-338; Sean Wilentz, "Against Exceptionalism:
Representation,
Class Consciousness and the American Labor Movement, 1790-1920," International
Laborand WorkingClassHistory,26 (Fall 1984), 1-24; Lacy K. Ford, Jr., "Republics
and Democracy: The Parameters of Political Citizenship in Antebellum South Carolina," in David R. Chesnutt and Clyde N. Wilson, eds., TheMeaningof SouthCarolina
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vocative modern criticism of Turner's overall thesis was developed by
New Left historian Staughton Lynd in the 1960s.42 Lynd attempted to
recast Turner's thesis so that it could adequately explain antebellum
sectional differences.43 Turner, Lynd insisted, not only underestimated the influence of slavery on American life, but also mistakenly
included slaveholders in the category of agrarians who championed
the expansion of democracy. Lynd countered that southern slaveholders, obsessed with property rights and the defense of minority power,
sought an alliance with the large capitalists of the North to preserve a
conservative, aristocratic republic.44 Moreover, Lynd suggested, the
Constitution represented not a Beardian triumph of capitalists over
agrarians, but an uneasy compromise between capitalists and slaveholders.45 This compromise, tested periodically over three-score years
and ten, eventually disintegrated in a bloody civil war. What is remarkable about the compromise of 1787 is not that it eventually collapsed, but that it lasted as long as it did. Doubtless an overriding
desire to see the American experiment in republicanism succeed gave
the compromise its strength, but according to Lynd and Barrington
Moore, the frontier helped give the compromise longevity by allowing
the free-labor economy of the North and the slave-labor economy of
the South room to expand on parallel tracks without collision.46
To be sure, the "frontier," or the western territories, became in
the nineteenth century what the slave trade was in the late eighteenth:
the primary point of controversy between North and South.47 But

See especially Staughton Lynd, "On Turner, Beard, and Slavery," Journal of
Negro History, 48 (Oct. 1963), 235-250; and Lynd, "Beyond Beard," in Barton J.
Bernstein, ed., Toward A New Past. Dissenting Essays in American History (New York
1968), 46-64. See also Lynd, Class Conflict, Slavery, and the United States Constitution
(Indianapolis 1967).
43 An earlier attempt to revise Turner along these lines was made in 1954 in two
companion essays written by Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick. Part I of their essay
on democracy in the old Northwest is cited in note sixteen above. See also "A Meaning for Turner's Frontier, Part II: The Southwest Frontier and New England,"
Political ScienceQuarterly,69 (Dec. 1954), 565-602.
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these controversies over Missouri, Texas, California, and Kansas all
were settled, albeit with escalating difficulty, by compromise. The
controversy over slavery in the territories often precipitated sectional
crises during the antebellum era, yet the territories themselves were
the safety-valve which prevented the show-down over slavery from occurring much earlier in the republic's history.48 King Cotton coveted
virgin land, and the frontier provided it. Proletarianization threatened the North's dynamic free-labor economy, but competition from
newly settled areas encouraged outmigration from the older rural areas of the North. The "hidden depression" of the 1850s, which drove
many former artisans and mechanics into wage labor just as the massive post-1848 wave of foreign immigration glutted the market, only
served to make the situation more volatile. Therefore, the frontier
loomed larger than ever in the minds of white northerners seeking a
"safety-valve" to avoid dependency.49 The Republican party's rallying cry of "free soil, free labor, free men" assumed a new ring of
urgency, and pressure to ban slave competition from all territories
intensified. Many northerners worried that the fabled upward mobility that Abraham Lincoln celebrated as the "right to rise" might be
jeopardized permanently. Thus, despite impressive macroeconomic
growth and rising personal incomes, Americans, North and South,
were haunted by fears that their status as independent householders
and their prospects for upward mobility were threatened unless they
enjoyed continued access to the frontier.50 By the late 1850s, in both
regions, ideas about independence and opportunity had grown inextricably tied to the frontier, and the controversy over free or slave
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a question of equal access to the frontier-proved
labor-essentially
the proximate cause of secession and Civil War.
Had the opportunity for parallel expansion across the shared frontier not existed, had not abundant land served as some kind of safetyvalve for both North and South, it seems probable that the inherent
contradictions between republican ideas and the material reality of
both the slave and free labor economies would have been exposed
much earlier, producing serious internal crises in both regions. These
earlier crises, coming before the democratic revolution had extended
full political rights to virtually all white men and established democratic politics as the realm of conflict resolution in the United States,
might well have prompted what Barrington Moore has described as a
reactionary coalition between northern capitalists and southern planters. This conservative coalition of propertied elites might have
worked to stunt the evolution of political democracy and guide the
republic down the repressive "Prussian Road" to industrial modernity.51 Without the yeomanry of the frontier to draw upon, resistance
to this reactionary coalition would have likely pushed upward from
below, from hard-pressed artisans and the emerging working class,
perhaps with some petty bourgeois assistance, in a kind of crude
American approximation of the failed European revolutions of 1848.52
Instead, the frontier delayed the crisis, giving the democratic revolution time to take hold and allowing the plain folk of both North and
South time to identify prospects for continued independence and opportunity with the existence of the frontier. By the time the sectional
tensions reached new heights late in the 1850s, the democratic revolution-which the frontier aided but did not cause-had done its work.
The capitalists of the North knew it was free-soilers and workers they
must placate and not southern slaveholders. Southern planters knew
it was the tenaciously independent plain folk, not Yankee entrepreneurs, whom they must convince to sustain slavery. Neither propertied elite saw a reactionary alliance as a viable option in the face of
intense political pressures from their respective beleaguered yeomanries.53 The defining struggle of nineteenth-century America was not
51
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between a national propertied elite and the producing masses over
access to political power, but between sections equally devoted to independence and opportunity, each desperately needing the frontier to
remake in their own image. The result of this struggle was the triumph of a liberal bourgeois democracy rather than the producers' republic for which the common folk, Union and Confederate, fought.54
But in shifting the battle onto this ground, Turner's frontier not only
helped save American democracy but pushed it to seek, albeit at a
terribly high price in blood, a "new birth of freedom."55
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